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Abstract 
 
In the context of an increasing reliance on predictive computer simulation models to 
calculate potential project impacts, it has become common practice in impact assessment 
(IA) to call on proponents to disclose uncertainties in assumptions and conclusions 
assembled in support of a development project.  Understandably, it is assumed that such 
disclosures lead to greater scrutiny and better policy decisions.  This paper questions this 
assumption.  Drawing on constructivist theories of knowledge and an analysis of the role 
of narratives in managing uncertainty, I argue that the disclosure of uncertainty can 
obscure as much as it reveals about the impacts of a development project.  It is proposed 
that the opening up of institutional spaces that can facilitate the negotiation and 
deliberation of foundational assumptions and parameters that feed into predictive models 
could engender greater legitimacy and credibility for IA outcomes. 
 
Keywords:  predictive simulation modelling, uncertainty, collaborative knowledge-
making, narrative analysis 
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OPENING NEW INSTITUTIONAL SPACES FOR GRAPPLING WITH 
UNCERTAINTY:  A CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
1. Introduction 
It has been recognized since the 1980s that uncertainty pervades impact assessment (IA) 
(Hellstrom and Jacob 1996).  As such, we have to live with uncertainty and learn to 
manage it (Glasson et al. 2005).  How is uncertainty managed in practice?  The United 
Kingdom’s Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment (IEMA) 
recommends disclosure (see also Glasson et al. 2005).  Clause 6 of its Practitioner’s Code 
of Practice states: 
Ensure that where incomplete baseline data is used in an assessment and/or 
uncertainty exists in the predictions or results of an assessment this is so 
indicated in [the] Environmental Impact Statement or Impact Assessment 
Report (IEMA no date: np).   
 
Here uncertainty is rendered manageable by its requisite disclosure.  Understandably, it is 
assumed that such disclosures lead to greater scrutiny of development projects and better 
policy decisions.  Such was the expectation of an independent statutory body overseeing 
the integrated impact assessment of the major energy infrastructure project in Australia 
known as Basslink – a 360 kilometre undersea electricity cable that now links the 
Australian mainland to its southern island state of Tasmania.  The project proponents 
were directed to be explicit about what was uncertain and contingent in their 
methodologies and conclusions in respect of the project: 
Assumptions, simplifications and scientific judgments should be stated 
clearly and the nature and magnitude of uncertainties should be clearly 
defined.  Where relevant, the choice of a particular methodology over 
alternative methodologies should be explained (JAP 2000: 41). 
 
Embodying the disclosure remedy, uncertainty here is assumed readily identifiable, 
quantifiable and communicable.  While it is acknowledged that the recognition of 
uncertainty in these terms is necessary, I will argue that it is not sufficient.  In my view, a 
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reliance on supposedly objective disclosure is unreliable in the predictive model context 
in which IA is now embedded (Duncan 2008).  Indeed, I would argue that a reliance on 
disclosure runs the risk of reductionism and leaves unexamined the social-interactive 
aspects of uncertainty.   
 
2. Analytic Framework 
2.1 A constructivist perspective and the challenging IA predictive model context 
Research from the field of science studies shows that perceptions of uncertainty can 
vary with their distance from sites of knowledge production and actors’ institutional 
locations across the domains of science and policy (Collins 1988, MacKenzie 1990; see 
also Jasanoff and Wynne 1998, Lahsen 2005, Shackley and Wynne 1995).  Drawing on 
these constructivist theories of knowledge, in Duncan (2008) I examine the epistemic 
implications of what has become standard IA practice whereby proponents engage 
multiple firms of consultants from across the biophysical and social sciences that utilize 
a range of predictive models to develop what eventually becomes a unified integrated 
impact assessment statement.  In this empirical study I illustrate how this knowledge-
making practice can both isolate from critique and perpetuate a proponent’s partisan 
worldview of what could or should transpire in the future if a project gains approval.  I 
show how, when the conclusions derived from one predictive model are passed between 
consultant firms and run through subsequent predictive models, uncertainties and 
contingencies can be amplified by virtue of the proponent’s knowledge production 
process that constitutes a knowledge producer simultaneously as a knowledge user.  The 
outcome is that with each modelling iteration the links between model inputs and 
outputs and their concomitant uncertainties and contingencies are severed (see also 
Vaughan 1999).  Consequently, possibilities for critique and disclosure are closed off: 
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unless explicit clarifications are called for, what has become standard 
procedure would serve to isolate actors contributing to the development of 
an integrated impact statement.  This isolation would diminish disclosure 
between collaborating consultants as well as to the impact statement 
audience, be they supporters, critics, regulators, assessors or decision-
makers.  Therefore, reliability of the conclusions presented in impact 
statements would not be attributable to the rigorous challenge or peer 
review of a proponent’s claims, but rather to ‘imposed trust’ between actors 
required to collaborate at the behest of a proponent (Duncan 2008: 63). 
 
In this context, uncertainties and contingencies would not and could not be known by 
individual actors that are merely links in a chain. 
 
2.2 A discourse approach  
To further illustrate the inadequacy of a reliance on the disclosure of uncertainty in IA, I 
now turn to analyzing its social-interactive dimensions.  Discourse is a conception of 
language as social practice (Wood and Kroger 2000).  This means that not only is our 
world described by our talk, it is constituted in and by that talk.  Burman and Parker 
(1993: 3) make the point that language also “constrains meaning” and that discourse 
analysis “offers a social account of subjectivity by attending to the linguistic resources 
by which the sociopolitical realm is produced and reproduced”.  Hajer (1995: 44) 
defines discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are 
produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through 
which meaning is given to physical and social realities”.  From a discursive perspective, 
a proponent’s rendition of the disclosure of uncertainty can be conceptualized as a 
social-interactive knowledge-making outcome (Hajer 1995) rather than an inventory of 
objective assumptions and limitations.  
 
2.3 The role of stories in uncertainty disclosure 
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Emery Roe, who has applied literary theory and sociolinguistics to policy-making 
(Hajer and Laws 2006: 260), advocates a focus in policy analysis on the stories people 
adopt, tell and perpetuate.  Roe maintains that when it is not possible to identify an 
objective reality in policy debates that are mired in complexity, polarization and 
uncertainty, the analytical task becomes one of describing how actors are “certain of 
uncertainty” and how actors persuade others about certainty (1994: 110).  Roe maintains 
that narratives are “the only things left to examine” in perplexing controversies (1994: 
3), and that certainty can derive from and is mobilised by stories:  
It is only when the reality being described is so uncertain … that we must 
look to how the structural features of narratives enable their narrators to 
speak with such certainty about the policy relevance of what is so uncertain, 
without thereby being implicated in the uncertainty being described (Roe 
1994: 112).  
 
 
According to Roe, the analytical task is not to judge whether claims are true or not, or to 
delve too far into technical debates over ambiguities (or create them), but to understand 
how the ambiguities were managed and a consensus formed around what become final 
outcomes.  Hajer and Laws (2006) identify a narrative analysis as a conceptual tool used 
by analysts “to capture how policy actors deal with ambiguity … and explain how 
policy makers structure reality to gain a handle on practical questions”.  These authors 
further argue that narrative analysts have “shown that storytelling is a principle way of 
ordering, of constructing shared meaning and organizational realities” (2006: 260 citing 
Boyce 1995).  In other words, the stories actors or actor-collectives tell amongst 
themselves help them make sense of and reduce complexity and uncertainty.  Is 
storytelling involved in the disclosure of uncertainty in IA?  When one considers the 
complexity and expanse of the issues IA seeks to address and integrate, the numbers of 
actors involved, its interminably deficient knowledge base, the high stakes of its 
decisions, its lack of post-project verification and its reliance on increasingly complex 
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predictive computer modelling to forecast an unknowable future; and given how 
foundational storytelling appears to be according to the above authors; arguably, it 
would be a surprise if this was not the case.   
 
3. A Narrative Analysis 
3.1 Predictive models, baselines and uncertainties 
Revealing the social-interactive aspects of uncertainty, in particular, the stories people 
tell about uncertainty, highlights the inadequacy of a reliance on disclosure to manage 
uncertainty.   Consider the Basslink project.  The proponent’s consultants’ were 
required to predict and integrate the environmental, social and economic impacts of 
connecting a State-based hydro-electricity system and the running of its lakes and rivers 
to a predominantly coal-based national electricity market operating on the Australian 
mainland.  To substantiate the hydro corporation proponent’s claim that the anticipated 
change from historically low volume and stable hydro power station discharges to 
considerably higher and more variable discharges to meet national peak demand would 
not compromise the World Heritage values of Tasmania’s Gordon River, the proponent 
had scant baseline data.  To make its case in accordance with the statutory requirements, 
the proponent’s consultants had to use power station discharge data with its unavoidable 
gaps and conversion limitations to predict what might occur with Basslink.  A 
predictive simulation model of the hydro-system was used.  It had been developed 
several years earlier when moves were afoot to privatise Tasmania’s hydro-system.  To 
integrate the financial aspects of the cable’s operations with potential environmental 
effects, a national electricity market trading module was incorporated into the hydro-
system model to simulate arbitrage transactions.  Subsequently, the assembled baseline 
data without imports and exports across link and a simulation with them was passed to 
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external environmental researchers to calculate environmental impacts of expected 
changes in power station discharges on the various aspects of river ecology (Duncan 
2006).  This meant that all of the environmental impact predictions were anchored to the 
proponent’s simulations that embedded its assumptions about how the hydro-system 
should operate in the future with and without the cable (Duncan 2008, 2004). 
 
3.2 A proponent’s story of being certain about what was uncertain  
Roe maintains that a narrative analysis should seek to focus attention on how actors are 
“certain of uncertainty” and how they attempt to persuade others about certainty (Roe 
1994: 110).  Hence, rather than conduct a critique of a project’s technical aspects which 
can descend into interminable arguments, a narrative analysis draws attention to the 
interstitial spaces that can be discursively glossed over in the midst of complexity and 
uncertainty.   
 
It was disclosed during the Basslink public inquiry by the proponent’s consultants that 
when it became evident that the comparison between the baselines resulted in a 
significant increase in the highest volume power station discharges with Basslink, they 
started looking much closer at their data (Connarty recorded testimony).  Their 
investigation identified what they believed were anomalies arising from the structure of 
the model.  The way the model was originally designed was to offer all the capacity of 
the Gordon power station (three turbines at once) into the market at one time.  The 
proponent’s consultants came to the conclusion that the model was biased.  Given that 
at this stage of the process it was not possible to develop a new simulation model, the 
ostensibly flawed model outputs were passed on to external researchers who concluded 
that Basslink would increase the probability of river bank scour (Koehnken et al. 2001) 
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and result in the loss of riparian vegetation in vulnerable zones up to a height of 
between 4.0-4.5 metres of the riverbank beyond an existing scour zone at 2.5 metres 
(Davidson and Gibbons 2001a: 11, 2001b: 10) and the loss of macroinvertebrate 
assemblages (Davies and Cook 2001).  To resolve the disparity, statements about 
environmental impacts throughout the impact assessment statement (IAS) were 
qualified by a story about a model bias.  For example: 
The … model in its present configuration makes offers on a power station-
by-power station basis without consideration for use of individual 
generators ... Output ... is therefore biased (NSR Environmental Consultants 
Pty Ltd 2001: 12-10). 
 
The proponent’s consultants further maintained in the IAS and at the public inquiry that 
the high level of discharges depicted in the so-called biased model were a worst-case 
scenario, which was unlikely to eventuate (Connarty 2001a; 2001b; recorded 
testimony).  Crucially, the assessment body adopted the story as its own: 
While there is uncertainty as to the actual rate of accelerated present rates of 
loss of riparian vegetation communities, it is reasonable to assume that these 
may be less than predicted using the [hydro-system simulation] model, 
which overestimates full gate discharge (JAP 2002: 345). 
 
3.3 A compelling story but an unexpected reality check 
After three years of pre- and three years of post-Basslink monitoring, it has been 
reported by the hydro corporation, under statutory monitoring requirements imposed 
through the assessment process, that environmental impacts on the Gordon River are 
occurring beyond the qualified claims settled upon during the assessment process.  
Increased seepage erosion is resulting in river bank slumping and the loss of riparian 
vegetation along vulnerable sections of the river banks between the height of 2.5–4.0 
metres (HT 2010: 110-111).  The proponent concludes: 
Over the post-Basslink period, the vegetation monitoring has shown 
sustained patterns of vegetation stratification in all zones and fluctuations 
between and within the monitored sites.  … The flow conditions considered 
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responsible for the increase in seepage erosion and subsidence which led to 
the vegetation changes were outside the pre-Basslink range … this requires 
an investigation into adaptive management options (HT 2010: 172) 
 
Environmental impacts such as these were predicted, documented and tendered in the 
IAS and testimony explaining them was presented during the public inquiry.  
Notwithstanding, the compelling story told by the proponent’s consultants about a 
model bias convinced the assessment panel to conclude that the environmental impacts 
were unlikely to be as severe as predicted (JAP 2002).   
 
Roe (1994: 2) maintains that stories are “a force in themselves”, that they can “resist 
change or modification even in the presence of contradicting empirical data” and that 
they can “stabilize assumptions for decision making”.  In my view, these theoretical 
propositions are useful for understanding the social-interactive role of narratives in a 
proponent’s rendition of uncertainty.  In terms of Basslink, in the midst of problematic 
baselines and data and a model not built for purpose, the proponent’s story about what it 
was certain about – a model bias – served to diminish the veracity and scale of 
conclusions derived by its external researchers about the potential environmental 
impacts of Basslink on the Gordon River.  The overall outcome of the model bias story 
was to shift an initial prediction of a 20 per cent increase in full capacity discharges 
(reported in the impact assessment statement) to an increase that was deemed 
“negligible” (Bluhdorn 2001: 4) during the public inquiry.   
 
3.4 What did the story gloss over? 
Of course, the uncertainties and contingencies across aspects of a project such as this 
are obviously considerable and predictions are all that can be made.  However, without 
adequate disclosure and opportunities for deliberation and negotiation of the numbers 
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that drive those predictions, the choices made by proponents and the values they 
embody lack legitimacy at the outset, even before conclusions are derived.  For 
example, the Basslink modelling embedded the proponent’s interpretations of 
extrapolations of past hydrological variability into the future, assumptions about the 
capacity of the existing hydro-system, potential future demand in the national and 
Tasmanian electricity markets and the hydro corporation’s potential future market share 
(Duncan 2008, 2006, 2004).  Stakeholders and publics are well aware of the nature of 
predictive models even if they do not understand the details.  They know that what goes 
in determines what comes out. 
 
4. A new approach to grappling with uncertainty 
4.1 A shift to collaborative knowledge-making 
In light of the challenges of a reliance on disclosure and the social-interactive aspects of 
the rendition of uncertainty, I now turn to asking what might be some alternative means 
of grappling with uncertainty in IA?  Partidario and Sheate (2012) provide considerable 
insight into some possibilities.  They propose the opening up of institutional spaces in 
IA that can facilitate power sharing and learning between proponents and stakeholders.  
They argue that linear models of knowledge transfer (citing Best and Homes 2010; see 
also Forsyth 2003; Irwin and Wynne 1996; Irwin 2001 for similar perspectives from the 
field of science studies) are insufficient to deal with the challenges now faced in IA, in 
particular in respect of Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and Sustainability 
Assessment (SA).   
 
4.2 Opportunities for negotiating key model assumptions and parameters 
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In practice, what Partidario and Sheate (2012) call knowledge brokerage based on a 
facilitator/learning school, and what I would call collaborative knowledge-making, 
would involve proponents and stakeholders deliberating to learn collectively in the 
process of coproducing knowledge needed to conduct SEA and SA.  In my view, 
Partidario and Sheate (2012) rightly emphasise the necessity of learning and facilitation 
in collaborative knowledge-making (see also Callon 2001, 1999; Cash 2006; 
Wallington et al. 2010).  The spaces they envisage could play a potentially crucial role 
in grappling with uncertainty by facilitating deliberation and negotiation of foundational 
assumptions and parameters before they become embedded in predictive models and 
obscured from view.  This move would acknowledge that “[k]nowledge and values 
owned by those other than proponents of projects, plans or policies may be critical in 
terms of their ability to hold those proponents to account and whether decisions 
ultimately are seen by others as legitimate” (Partidario and Sheate 2010, np).  Hence, 
the uncertainties and contingencies that can travel so readily through predictive models 
would be deliberatively negotiated before they are set on their path. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
To conclude, I have argued that the disclosure of uncertainty is necessary but not 
sufficient.  It has been shown that a practitioner’s capacity to adequately disclose 
uncertainty is seriously diminished in light of current epistemic practice that is reliant 
upon multiple sets of consultants and predictive models.  It is doubtful that actors 
receiving model inputs to create model outputs could possibly assess or appropriately 
disclose the extent of the uncertainties and contingencies.  From this vantage point, the 
assumption that uncertainties can faithfully be catalogued and disclosed appears 
somewhat naïve and the practice of disclosure limited to providing less than partial 
accounts.  Revealing the social-interactive aspects of uncertainty with a narrative 
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analysis illustrated the extent of the challenge to manage uncertainty with a reliance on 
disclosure.  It has been argued by Partidario and Sheate (2012) that new institutional 
spaces need to be opened up in IA to facilitate the coproduction of knowledge with a 
focus on facilitation and learning between stakeholders and proponents.  My research on 
the problematic epistemic implications of current IA practice supports these calls for 
reform.  I have argued here that the opening up of new IA institutional spaces could 
facilitate the deliberation and negotiation of foundational assumptions that feed into 
predictive models and learning about the dimensions and implications of the 
contingencies inherent in any knowledge claims.  In my view, this would be a superior 
approach for seeking to grapple with uncertainty as it has the potential to engender 
greater legitimacy and credibility for IA outcomes.  
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